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ABSTRACT
The paper argues that it is a mistake to define habit as behaviour or action; as
a regular conjunction of actions; as a stock; as a form of automaticity (although
habit is acquired and activated automatically); as a tendency, propensity or dis-
position (even though habit acts tendentially); as a mechanism; and as a process
(even though habit is acquired and activated via several processes). A taxonomic
definition is provided wherein habit is a cognitive representation of a cue-action
response.
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1. Introduction
Whilst the disciplines of economics and habit psychology1 contain (at least)
eight definitions of habit, all but one of them are mistaken – or so I will
argue. Indeed, I will work my way through all eight definitions, eliminating
the mistaken ones, and ending up with what Hodgson (2018) calls a ‘taxo-
nomic definition’. What makes this valuable, is that a scientific community
(such as that of socio-economists) requires a taxonomic definition as a prelude
to carrying out, and evaluating, theory and research.2
The terrain of habit is not easy for economists to tread because it means
familiarising ourselves with psychological terms and concepts that we are
not, typically, au fait with.3 Indeed, I will not take everything habit psycholo-
gists have to say uncritically and, moreover, I will deploy insights from other
disciplines.
Whilst in economics the term ‘habit’ appears, different definitions of habit
reflect different conceptions of human agents, built into different schools of
economic thought. Two such conceptions stand out. Some schools are built
CONTACT Steve Fleetwood steve.fleetwood@uwe.ac.uk
1 References to ‘habit psychology’ is a shorthand and includes appropriate cognitive and neurosciences.
2 Maréchal (2010, section 3, 2009, pp. 77–80) attempt something similar.
3 A small number of economists are, of course, au fait with psychology – e.g. Brown (2013).
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upon Rational Economic Man (REM). Other schools are built upon the Socially
Embedded Individual (SEI). Whilst the SEI is conceived of as sometimes delib-
erating, and calculating, and cognising and acting consciously, the SEI is also
conceived of as cognising and acting unconsciously or automatically (Davis
2003, 2011, Hodgson 2013, chapter 1).
The paper has four sections and a conclusion. Section 2 deals with some
caveats and introduces key terms. Section 3 identifies three definitions of habit
found in schools of economic thought built upon REM – i.e. habit as action;4 as
the regular conjunction of past and current action; and as a stock. I will argue
that each of these definitions are mistaken. Section 4 identifies five definitions
of habit found, not only in schools of economic thought built upon the SEI, but
also in habit psychology, namely: habit as a cognitive representation of cue-
action associations; as a mechanism; as a disposition or tendency; as a form of
automaticity; and as a process. I will argue that all but the first of these defi-
nitions are mistaken. The conclusion presents a taxonomic definition of habit
before adding a note on future research.
2. Some caveats and terms
2.1. Defining definition
Hodgson (2018) argues that a scientific community requires a definition as
a prelude to carrying out, and evaluating, theory and research, and the kind
of definition needed to accomplish this is a taxonomic definition – i.e. one
that identifies the minimum number of properties sufficient to demarcate the
class of habits from classes of other phenomena, such as stereotypes or norms.
According to Hodgson, taxonomic definitions can be formed from six main
sub-types, of which I will mention four,5 presented in the context of habit.
A lexical definition is based upon the customary or dictionary meaning
of the term ‘habit’ found, in this context, in comments by economists and
psychologists.
A stipulativedefinition is baseduponestablishingone’s ownmeaning. Some
degree of stipulation is necessary in order to carry out remedial work on lexical
definitions. Sometimes this involves the addition of concepts found outside
psychology, and sometimes the addition of my own insights.
A nominal definition has several facets. It depends upon the meaning of
terms, clarifying how they can, and cannot, be used; it involves a process
of naming; the categories we use to construct it are those we find conve-
nient; thewarrant for any particular definition is pragmatic; and it is something
researchers impose upon the world, irrespective of the way the world is.
4 Where possible I use the term action, in preference to behaviour and practice.
5 I leave aside intensionality and extensionality.
REVIEW OF SOCIAL ECONOMY 133
A real, or essential, definition identifies some of the essential features that
make an entity the kind of entity it is – e.g. water is H2O. A real definition is
something the world imposes on researchers, as it were, so it represents the
way the world is.
I have a slightly different ‘take’ on the distinction between real and nominal
definitions, but this is not the place to discuss it. I do, however, need to explain
my use of these terms because the taxonomic definition of habit I advocate
is realist. According to Gupta (2015) ‘to discover the real definition of a term
X one needs to investigate the thing or things denoted by X ; to discover the
nominal definition, one needs to investigate themeaning and use of X ’. Gupta
alsowrites: ‘The chemist aims at real definition,whereas the lexicographer aims
at nominal definition’. Consider the following statement from Diller (2012): ‘A
kitten is a young cat’. Read from left to right, this is a real definition because
it explains a property essential to all kittens – i.e. a stage of maturity. Read
from right to left, this is a nominal definition because it explains the meaning
of the term ‘young cat’ via another term ‘kitten’. This merely substitutes one
term for, hopefully, a better understood term. An example of a real and nomi-
nal definition of habit, respectively, is ‘habit is a cognitive representation’ and
‘habit is a custom’.6
Let me end this section with five observations. First, to reject a definition on
the grounds that it is mistaken does not prevent it being a real, or a nominal
definition: it is simply a mistaken real or nominal definition.
Second, my objective would be made far easier if a canonical text existed,
identifying carefully crafted phrases, explicitly intended to be definitions of
habit. No such text exists.Most lexical definitions take the formof passing com-
ments where phrases like ‘habit is an x’ appears in a sentence not specifically
intended tobe adefinition. This leavesmewith adilemma. If I present a passing
comment, and claim it is a lexical definition, a critic can refute this by denying
that it is intended as a definition. But, given that such passing comments are
often all there is, if I do not use them I cannot present any definitions whatso-
ever. To recognise thatmany lexical definitions are passing comments I add the
prefix ‘proto’ and refer to ‘proto-lexical’ definitions – henceforth pldefinitions.
These pldefinitions of habit range from ‘weak’ to ‘strong’, but even ‘weak’ ones
must be used because they constitute the raw material for all definitional
work.
Third, the literature of habit psychology is littered with inconsistency (a)
between researchers, illustrated by the mere fact of different pldefinitions;
and (b) within researchers, illustrated by the fact that the same researcher
can offer different pldefinitions. I exemplify this via the work of two of the
leaders in the field. In Verplanken’s (2018) own chapter, a habit is a memory-
based propensity and is a memory-based cognitive associative entity, yet
6 See Mantzavinos (2006) for a totally different interpretation of definition.
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when writing with Rebar and colleagues (2018) in another chapter, habits are
processes. Verplanken’s definitions also shift depending upon whether he is
writing with Orbell, Melkevik, or Darnton and colleagues. Gardner has defined
habit as a type of behaviour (Gardner et al. 2011), a form of automaticity (Gard-
ner 2012), and a process (Gardner 2015b). I raise this matter not to point
the finger at these two researchers but to show that most researchers in the
field have not attended to the inconsistencies in their positions, indeed, I do
not think most are even aware of them – with notable exceptions such as
Gardner.
Fourth, a taxonomic definition of habit should not be confused or conflated
with accounts of habit that describe, explain, or depict the way habit is acquired
and activated.7 I will return to this important point in Section 4.5.
Fifth, a taxonomic definition should be parsimonious, ideally of the form
‘habit is an x’, without additional information that would transform it into a
description, explanation or depiction.
2.2. Simple and complex habits
Habit psychology is dominated by empirical research on individuals, albeit,
individuals often acting with others – e.g. eating, drinking, going to the gym,
reading newspapers, watching television and so on. To cite one oft-used exam-
ple, when people go to the cinema, they often (habitually) buy popcorn (Wood
and Rünger 2016, p. 292). Indeed, I will use the ‘cinema-popcorn habit’ as an
exemplar throughout thepaper. Someeconomistsmightbe concernedby this,
not only because of its focus on the individual, but also because they are inter-
ested in more complex socio-economic actions – e.g. habits in commuting,
voting, energy use, consumption, or habits in the workplace, job-seeking and
so on. Allow me to alleviate these concerns.
Only individuals can acquire habits which are located in their individual
procedural memories – i.e. you cannot acquire my habits and there is no
Borg-like collective memory.8 But, habit acquisition requires individuals to
engage in regular or repeated action, and this is often the result of them being
enabled or constrained by social structures or institutions. This is relatively well
known. Socio-economists often refer to the ‘reconstitutive downward effect’
of structures or institutions (Hodgson 2011). Psychologists often refer to mind
being ‘scaffolded’ by environmental or cultural structures (Garcia-Marques and
Ferreira 2009).
But, habits are often said to be complex. There is no consensus on the
use of the term, but two recent contributions should suffice to explain it. For
7 For example, Foerde (2018, p. 17) lists a set of attributes that, she suggests, define the habit construct. See
Gardner (2015a, pp. 278–280) for a useful comment on definitions in the context of habit.
8 On memory see Sutton (2010).
REVIEW OF SOCIAL ECONOMY 135
Gardner, and colleagues, complex actions are those that feature a greater num-
ber of psychologically meaningful sub-actions, and so are more cognitively
effortful to perform to completion. Most actions can be broken down into
sub-components such that actions are composed of lower-level, subservient
sub-actions. For example, ‘eating popcorn when watching a movie’ may be
decomposed into ‘entering the cinema’, which can be further decomposed
into ‘pushing open the cinema door’, ‘purchasing a cinema ticket’, and so on.9
These individual actions are ‘chunked’ into a coherent, integratedwhole action
in procedural memory. Gardner et al. (2016) and Gardner and Lally (2018) con-
ceive of this as involving the selection of action, involving the activation of a
cognitive representation; and performance, involving the unfolding and even-
tual termination of a sequence of sub-actions. They refer to these two action
stages as ‘habitual instigation’ and ‘habitual execution’ respectively. Habitual
instigation seems to operate as an automated reminder to act, obviating the
need for external reminders. Habitual execution makes procedural enactment
smooth and efficient, allowing agents to attend to matters unrelated to ongo-
ing actions executed automatically (Gardner etal. 2016, p. 617). See alsoMarien
et al. (2018, pp. 57–58).
Mullan and Novoradovskaya’s (2018, circa 739) notion of complexity is
slightly different. They offer a taxonomy based upon the number of steps in
a behavioural sequence; and the outcome of the behaviour, apropos imme-
diate hedonic benefit to distal benefit. They create what we might call four
‘ideal types’: one-step hedonic behaviours (e.g. consuming sugar-sweetened
beverages); multi-step hedonic behaviours (e.g. using reusable drink contain-
ers); one-step distal benefit behaviours (taking supplements); and multi-step
distal benefit behaviours (e.g. recycling).
In sum, because the acquisition and activation of all habits, simple or com-
plex, involves similar processes, there is noproblemexplaininghabits via a sim-
ple cinema-popcorn habit. Indeed, it allows us to keep the focus on explaining
these processes, without getting distracted by more complex examples.
2.3. Context cue
Whilst there is widespread agreement that cues trigger, or activate habit,
there is little agreement on what constitute cues. Indeed, sometimes they are
referred to as ‘stimuli’, and sometimes context is run together with ‘cues’, as in
‘context cues’. Identifying context cues that apply broadly is much simpler for
some behaviours (e.g. teeth brushing) than others (e.g. smoking) (Labrecque
and Wood 2015, pp. 306–307). In experimental conditions, the cue is always
somethingvery specific suchas a sound, that triggers a very specific action such
9 Gardner and Tang (2013, pp. 267–268) note the subjective element in the way people interpret the
meaning of an ostensibly identical action. For example, participants in their study variously interpreted
‘commuting’ to begin when leaving home, when waiting for a bus or train, or when aboard the vehicle.
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as abuttonpresswhich, in turn, triggers a very specific outcomesuchas the illu-
mination of a light. Outside of the laboratory, the context cue involved in habit
acquisition andactivation is often ‘fuzzy’ – e.g. ‘being in abar’ (Mazar andWood
2018, p. 18), or ‘being 08:00 on aweekday’ (Rhodes and Rebar 2018, p. 92). Even
the relatively simple cinema-popcorn habit does not actually involve a simple
action (e.g. entering cinema, and buying popcorn), but a series of actions, such
as pushing open the cinema door, walking into the lobby, waiting in a queue,
smelling the popcorn, requesting and receiving a cinema ticket, asking for the
popcorn, handing over themoney and so on. In some cases, the cue is the con-
text, hence context cue, and could be a place, a time, a situation, a physical
location, other people, a mood, and so on. The habitual action of commuting
to work using the car, for example, could be activated by it being 08.00 hours
on a workday (e.g. not 10.00 on a non-workday).
2.4. Cognition
Much psychology is rooted in the Classical View of Cognition wherein the
‘mind is basically an intracranial information processing system manipulating
(sub)symbolic representations; cognition essentially is this computational pro-
cess’ (De Bruin and Kästner 2012, p. 542). On this view, the locus of action is the
brain, essentially a computer, which encodes incoming information as repre-
sentations (i.e. mini-replicas, or pictures, of external objects or events, symbols,
sub-symbols, schemas and rules) then issues a set of instructions to a passive
bodywhich executes them.More recently, Phenomenologically oriented alter-
natives have emerged wherein the locus of action is not just the brain. Rather,
as ‘beings-in-the-world’ our cognition is embodied (i.e. involving the body);
extended, distributed or embedded (i.e. into or in the external environment);
enacted or situated (i.e. involving practical activities); anticipatory (i.e. involv-
ing forward looking and pre-prepared); and dynamic (i.e. continually adapting
to changes in the external environment).10
Moreover, the kind of habitual action we are interested in is social action.
This involves farmore thanmere bodilymovements because it requires agents
to interpret,11 or ‘read’ situations, the actions of other agents, and to knowhow
to engage with phenomena like rules. Thus, an agent with a cinema-popcorn
habit has to do a great deal of interpretive work between entering the cinema
and watching the film munching her popcorn. Nevertheless, without cogni-
tive, neurological, and bodily action, along with social and interpretive action,
the appropriate neural changes necessary for the acquisition and activation of
habit could not occur.
10 This is understood by Hodgson (2004a, p. 175). See Gallagher and Crisafi’s (2009) work on ‘mental
institutions’. See also Fleetwood (2019).
11 I am tempted to use the term ‘hermeneutic’ but will stick solely with ‘interpretative’ in case this is
misunderstood as a commitment to a hermeneutic philosophy more widely.
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2.5. Representations
Whilst I am going to argue that habit is a cognitive representation, I am per-
fectly aware that this is a highly contested term. There are, speaking very
broadly, three main ‘positions’ apropos representation. For those operating in
the Classical paradigm, representations (as sketched above) exist. For those
operating in the Phenomenological paradigm representations do not exist,
indeed, they are unnecessary. Beings-in-the-world get everything they need to
guide their action from theworld, so there is no need for something called ‘rep-
resentations’ to perform the guiding function. Then there are those who reject
theClassical paradigm, accept a great deal of the Phenomenological paradigm,
but draw a line at the claim that human agents get everything they need to
guide their action from the world. For those operating from this position, rep-
resentations are believed to exist. This position is illustrated in the work of De
Bruin and Kästner (2012, pp. 549–550) who adopt a ‘weaker reading’ – i.e. a
representation can be any kind of stand-in for another item. This is the position
that I will take throughout this paper.12
Incidentally, to argue, as I will, that habits are cognitive representations,
means they are located in agents’ cognitive systems (broadly conceived, more
specifically, in procedural memory.
2.6. (Un)consciousness and automaticity
Consciousness and unconsciousness are not dichotomous states but exist on
a continuum from completely conscious to completely unconscious.13 A cogni-
tive process, such as that involved in habit, is said to be relatively (un)conscious
when the agent is relatively (un)conscious of (a) the stimulus input that evokes
a process, (b) the output of a process, (c) the process or its constituent steps, or
(d) the consequences of a process (Moors and De Houwer 2006, pp. 312–314).
Cognising and acting unconsciously allows us to minimise cognitive load – i.e.
themental effort involvedwith consciously deliberating and calculating. It is, of
course, always possible that an agent realises s/he is acting habitually, and con-
sciously intervenes to suspend, or ‘kick’ the habit. But,most habit psychologists
consider habitual action to be carried out, if not completely unconsciously,
then towards that end of the spectrum. ‘Most researchers agree that some
parts of habitual mechanisms operate outside of awareness’ (Marien et al.
2018, p. 54).
(Un)consciousness is, however, one of six ‘features’ of automaticity – a term
virtually unknown in economics, but widely used in psychology. Thinking is
12 For an overview of work on representations see Gallagher (2013, 2015) and Gangopadhyay (2011).
Clowes andMendonça (2015) defend aweaker view, and Hutto (2013) takes a radical Phenomenological
view.
13 This is often conceived of in terms of Types 1 and 2 systems of thinking. See Evans and Stanovich (2013,
especially table 1) for an overview.
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said to be automatic if it is characterised by one, or several, of the follow-
ing features: it is uncontrolled, unintentional, goal dependent, purely stimulus
driven, unconscious, efficient or fast. Automaticity is a contested concept, and
‘despite its central nature, there is no consensus about what automaticity
means’ (Moors and De Houwer 2006, p. 297). Disagreement is, however, less
about the existence of automaticity, and more about inter alia how agents
combine automatic and non-automatic thinking; about how exactly the var-
ious features operate; or whether we have to accept the ‘all-or-none view’ –
i.e. if automaticity has no clear set of defining features then it does not exist.
In sum, I agree with their conclusion (Moors and De Houwer 2006, p. 321) that
the ‘term automaticity may be kept as an umbrella term’ whilst investigators
should specify which feature(s) they are dealing with. Contestation notwith-
standing, as a matter of fact, automaticity is used as a defining feature of habit
and henceforth I will use it in preference to the term ‘unconscious’. For most
habit psychologists, habits are acquired and activated automatically.14
2.7. Approaches to economics
Three points are worth noting. First, I am not dividing economists into non-
mainstream and mainstream, but into those operating with SEI and REM.
Second, there aremany versions of REM, and some versions are augmented by
including inter alia bounded rationality, informational limitations, and uncer-
tainty. Yet, one particular characteristic is important in the context of habit.
All of REM’s cognising and acting is assumed to be deliberative, calculative, and
carried out consciously or non-automatically. When I refer to REM, I am refer-
ring specifically to this characteristic. Third, given that I am working on the
cusp of economics and psychology, why not discuss behavioural economics
(BE), experimental economics (EE), and neuroeconomics (NE)?15 There are two
related reasons. First, the topic of habit is notwidely discussed in BE, EE andNE.
Second, whilst different versions of REM appear in BE, EE and NE, all three have
a conception of agentswho cognise and act consciously, or non-automatically.
For example, Brette et al. (2014, p. 405) concur: ‘The various approaches in neu-
roeconomics (in spite of significant discrepancies) are primarily interested in
studying choice behaviour’. If, however, someone operating under the rubric
of BE, EE and NE should opt to investigate habit using a conception of agents
who cognise and act unconsciously or automatically this would not present a
problem for my categorisation: I would simply place them in the SEI camp.16
14 See reviews by Ferguson and Bargh (2004), Bargh et al. (2012), Moors and De Houwer (2006) and Moors
(2016). Baumeister et al. (2011) offer a wide-ranging discussion of conscious and unconscious think-
ing; Ashby et al. (2010) discuss automaticity in cognitive science; and De Bruijn et al. (2014) discuss
automaticity in habit psychology.
15 I thank an anonymous reviewer for drawing my attention to this omission.
16 For a sample of recent research on BE, EE and NE that supports my contention see: Best et al. (2012),
Brocas and Carrillo (2014), Camerer (2008), Cobb-Clark et al. (2014), Carbonea andDuffy (2014), Damasio
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2.8. Habit of thought or habit of action
The term ‘habit of thought’ (and variants like ‘habit of mind’) crop up in eco-
nomics and psychology. Habits of thought are different to habits of action
because when a habit of thought is activated, it tends to bring about another
thought, not another action. As Hodgson (2010, p. 11) observes ‘government
health warnings and medical advice may change our habit of thought, from
regarding alcohol as enjoyable to its perception as a dangerous drug’. Whilst
habits of action arewidely discussed, habits of thought are not. I will be dealing
only with habits of action.17
3. REM-based economics and the definitions of habit
In this section I will present three pldefinitions of habit found in schools of
economic thought built upon REM, namely, habit as action; as the regular con-
junction of past and current action; and as a stock. I will argue that each one is
mistaken.
3.1. Habit as action
The first pldefinition of habit as behaviour, practice or action is not exclusive
to REM-based economics, and appears in dictionary entries, sociology and
psychology – as the following comments illustrate
Habit formation is a well-documented behavioural regularity in psychology and
behavioural economics. (Leventoğlu 2017, p. 477)
First, somedefinitions. I amgoing to use the term ‘habits’ to refer to practices that
are recurrently and consistently reproduced by suitably committed practitioners.
(Shove 2012, p. 103)
Habit is a settled tendency or practice. (Oxford Dictionary 10th ed 2000)
[A] ‘habit’ . . . is a behaviour that is under the control of S–R mechanisms . . . .
[A] habit is a behaviour that is elicited by environmental stimuli to which it has
become strongly tied . . . [H]abits are behaviours. (Ashby et al. 2010, p. 209)
[Habits are] considered to be situationally guided goal directed behaviours, and
hence, behavioural responses. (Holland et al. 2006, p. 776)
The historical definition of habits is that they are behaviours rooted in SR associa-
tions that have been acquired through learning based on reinforcement. (Smith
and Graybiel 2016, p. 34)
On these pldefinitions, habit is action; it iswhat agents do, andwhatweobserve
them doing. Unfortunately, there are three problems with this definition. First,
and Damasio (2016), Driscoll and Holden (2014), Konovalov and Krajbich (2019), Ross (2014, chapter 4)
and Westbrook and Braver (2015). See Section 3.3 below.
17 See Verplanken et al. (2007) and Verplanken (2018) for discussions of the concept, and Fisher et al. (2017)
for an application.
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it is a straightforward logical mistake, namely, it mixes-up cause and effect:
habit cannot be both the action, and the cause of that action (Maddux 1997,
p. 336). As Rebar et al. (2018, p. 31) put it ‘Habit is the process that determines
behaviour, and habitual behaviour is the output of that process’.18 Second,
reducinghabit to actiondenies a role for cues – e.g. entering the cinema. Aswill
become clear, virtually all contemporary habit psychologists agree that a cue is
necessary for habit acquisition and activation. Third, reducing habit to action
eliminates the possibility that habit could be anything other than an action,
such as a cognitive representation.
Sub-conclusion §1. It is a mistake to define habit as an action.
3.2. Habit as the regular conjunction of past and current actions
In REM-based economics, habit is often pldefined as a regular conjunction of a
quantity of a good consumed in the past, with the quantity of the same good
consumed in the present.
Habit formation is a well-documented behavioural regularity in psychology and
behavioural economics. Accordingly, humanbeings formhabits for consumption
and their current satisfaction level tends to be highly correlated with their past
consumption level. (Leventoğlu 2017, p. 477)
I define habitual behaviour as displaying a positive relation between past and
current consumption. (Becker 1992, p. 328)
Habit, then, is a regular conjunction of a quantity of a good (x) consumed in
the past, with the quantity of the same good (x) consumed in the present or,
for brevity, a regular conjunction of actions occurring over time.
There are, however, four problemswith this pldefinition. First, it is merely an
extension of the habits as actions definition presented in the previous section.
Notice that the comment from Leventoglu appears here and in Section 3.1.
Second, (mis)conceivinghabit to themerememoryof past actions (which influ-
ence present actions) has nothing to do with how habit is conceived by most
contemporary habit psychologists. Third, reducing habit to the mere memory
of past actions, once again denies a role for cues and, therefore, suffers from
the same problem noted in Section 3.1. Fourth, it makes habit entirely depen-
dent upon the existence of a regular conjunction of actions occurring over time:
no regular conjunction of actions, no habit. If, as wewill see in Section 4.4 below,
habit acts tendentially, meaning that we might not observe a regular conjunc-
tion of actions. The cinema-goer might, for example, have insufficient funds to
buy the popcorn, and yet still have the cinema-popcorn habit.
Sub-conclusion §2. It is a mistake to define habit as the regular conjunction of
past and present actions.
18 Incidentally, this misconception cannot be rescued by appeals to the (legitimate) concept autopoiesis.
See Section 4.5.
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3.3. Habit as a stock
Some contemporary REM-based economists include ‘deep habit’ in their mod-
els, especially New Keynesian business cycle models (Givens 2015, p. 1148).
Havranek et al.’s (2017) meta-analysis cites 81 published studies on habit for-
mation, of which over 70 were published since 2000. Let us pick-out a few
salient points from this literature. 19
The term ‘habit’ often appears alongside terms like ‘preferences’, ‘tastes’,
‘formation’ and ‘persistence’. Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2008, p. 814) note
that: ‘Habit persistence, or “habit formation”, in its most common represen-
tation, is a preference specification’. Habit is quantified, typically, as a stock
variable, although Deaton (1999, pp. 16–17) is vague about what this means:
this variable ‘might represent the stock of durable goods, or more vaguely, a
psychological stock of habit or of preference ‘capital’. For Ravn et al. (2010, p.
317) ‘the stock of habit . . . is an increasing function of past consumptions’. For
Aloui (2013, p. 1660) ‘Households that consume a large amount of a particu-
lar good today are more likely to buy this kind of good in the future by force
of habit’. For Rozen (2010, pp. 1341–1344) an agent’s ‘intrinsic habit’ appears
to be his or her ‘consumption history’. ‘The decision maker’s preferences over
the space of consumption streams . . . depend on her consumption history,
her habit . . . . [She] knows that her future tastes will be influenced by her con-
sumption history’. For Rustichini and Siconolfi (2014, pp. 55–56) ‘the memory
of past consumption experience affects preferences over present and future
choices . . . Withhabit formation, present andpast consumption choices affect
the habit stock and, hence, the preferences over continuation paths’.
All this is highly ambiguous, so allowme to presentmy interpretation. Habit
could be defined, as a preference. Apart from the fact that it is unclear what
exactly this means, it misses an important point. ‘Crucially, our habits help to
make up our preferences and dispositions. When new habits are acquired or
existing habits change, then our preferences alter’ (Hodgson 2004b, p. 656).
Habit could be defined as the regular conjunction of past and current actions,
à la Becker. But, it makes more sense (from this perspective) to define it as
a ‘psychological stock’ encoded in memory. Chetty and Szeidl (2016, p. 855)
state, explicitly, that ‘habit stock is a weighted average of past consumption’.
This memory of past consumption then affects ‘the preferences over continu-
ation paths’ and, thereby, future consumption. Henceforth, I will refer to this
pldefinition as habit as a stock – i.e. a stock of past actions, located inmemory.
There is a fundamental problemwith defining habit as a stock: it has no con-
ception of a cue and is simply amemory of actions taken in the past. As we will
see below, even if they disagree on the details, almost all habit psychologists
define habit as being acquired and activated by cues.Whilst it may be true that
19 It is not necessary, here, to differentiate between deep and superficial habits. See Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribe (2008) and Aloui (2013, p. 1660). See Crawford (2010) for a more general, theoretical approach.
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agents often engage in an action today (e.g. buy product x) because they regu-
larly bought product x in the past, such action is not habitual action, and it is not
caused by a habit. Habit as a stock is not a definition that psychologists would
recognise as habit.
Sub-conclusion §3. It is a mistake to define habit as a stock of past actions.
Before leaving this section, I want to raise an important issue.Whilstmost REM-
based economists assume that REM cognises and acts consciously, virtually all
contemporary habit psychologists agree that habit operates unconsciously or
automatically. If this is the case, then REM-based economistsmust either aban-
don REM, or abandon (what they call) habit. And yet many remain committed
to both REM and habit. There appears to be two ways to try and reconcile this
contradiction. The first is for REM-based economists to ignore contemporary
habit psychology, and claim that habit is conscious, as Becker does.
[M]any writers have claimed that habitual behaviour is not fully rational . . . [I]t is
not obvious to me that they [i.e. habits] are less rational than other preferences.
(Becker 1992, p. 331)
I am claiming in this paper that habitual behaviour does not imply a reluctance
to calculate. (Becker 1992, p. 332)
If agents act habitually, but this behaviour does not ‘imply a reluctance to cal-
culate’, then this behaviour must be calculative and conscious. Habit, or rather
habitual action is, thereby, re-jigged to be conscious.20 Unfortunately, this flies
in the face of contemporary habit psychology.
Second, the problem can simply be ignored. REM-based economists rou-
tinely refer to habits as actions, as the regular conjunction of past and present
actions or as a stock of past actions. Whilst there are occasional mentions
of habits being unconscious there is no mention of a contradiction between
agents that cognise and act consciously, guided by deliberation and calcu-
lation, and agents that do so unconsciously. The contradiction is simply not
recognised.
4. SEI-based economics and the definitions of habit
In this section I will present five pldefinitions of habit found, not only in schools
of economic thought built upon SEI, but also found in habit psychology,
namely, habit as a cognitive representation of cue-action associations; as a
mechanism; as a disposition or tendency; as a form of automaticity; and as a
process.21
20 Waller (1988, p. 123) show that the Austrian economist Von Mises does something similar – i.e. ‘assert
that nonreflective behaviour is reflective’.
21 I have deliberately not taken a History of Economic Thought approach because returning the work of
Pierce, Dewey, Veblen and James, for example, will only take us back into (some of) the eight definitions
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A habit is a disposition to engage in previously adopted or acquired behaviour
(including patterns of thought) that is triggered by an appropriate stimulus or
context. Habits are influenced by prior activity and have durable, self-sustaining
qualities. (Hodgson 2015, p. 269)
Habits are submerged repertoires of potential behaviour; they can be trig-
gered or reinforced by an appropriate stimulus or context. The meaning of
habit adopted by Veblen [and others] was of an acquired proclivity or capac-
ity, which may or may not be actually expressed in current behaviour . . . But
if we acquire a habit we do not necessarily use it all the time. It is a propensity
to behave in a particular way in a particular class of situations. (Hodgson 2003,
p. 652)
[T]he view of habit here is of a disposition, which, once acquired, is not neces-
sarily realised in any future behaviour. Habit is a causal mechanism. (Hodgson
2010, p. 4)
In the current psychology literature, habits are defined as ‘behavioural disposi-
tions to repeat well-practised actions given recurring circumstances’. Building on
this basis, themanagement and economics literature defines habit as individual-
level behavioural tendencies, or ‘dispositions to engage in previously adopted or
acquired behaviour that is triggered by an appropriate stimulus or context’. By
evoking the same actionwhen exposed to the same cue, repeated action creates
if-then links between actions and cues such as times, places, and people that are
typically present during performance. (Becker and Knudsen 2017, p. 46)
First, habits . . . are largely learned; in current terminology, they are acquired
via experience dependent plasticity. Second, habitual behaviours occur repeat-
edly over the course of days or years, and they can become remarkably
fixed. Third, fully acquired habits are performed almost automatically, vir-
tually nonconsciously, allowing attention to be focused elsewhere. Fourth,
habits tend to involve an ordered, structured action sequence that is prone
to being elicited by a particular context or stimulus. And finally, habits
can comprise cognitive expressions of routine (habits of thought) as well
as motor expressions of routine. These characteristics suggest that habits
are sequential, repetitive, motor, or cognitive behaviours elicited by exter-
nal or internal triggers that, once released, can go to completion without
constant conscious oversight. (Graybiel, cited in Becker and Knudsen 2017,
p. 28)
All five of the sought after pldefinitions of habit are mentioned in the above
comments, let us consider each of them in turn.
4.1. Habit as a cognitive representation
Let us start with pldefinitions of habit as cognitive representations of some
kind.
we already have without adding clarity. For this approach see Brette et al. (2017), Duroy (2016), Hodg-
son (1997, 2003, 2004, 2006a, 2006b, 2007), Jackson (2009), Lawson (2015), Maréchal (2009), Rutherford
(1999, pp. 51–67), Schwanen et al. (2012) and Waller (1988).
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[T]he stimulus response association, that is habit . . . The mental association
derived from past stimulus response association is the defining mechanism by
which a habit response occurs. (Orbell and Verplanken 2015, p. 312)
Previous research into the cognitive processes underlying habitual behaviours
indicates that habits are mentally represented as associations. (Danner et al. 2011,
p. 190)
[E]vidence fromsocial cognitive and fromneuroscience research convergeon the
idea that habits aredirect context–response associations inmemory thatdevelop
with repetition. (Wood and Neal 2009, p. 580)
Habits reflect associative learning and the formation of context-response associ-
ations in procedural memory. Once habits form, perception of the context auto-
matically brings the response to mind, and people often carry out that response.
(Wood and Rünger 2016, p. 306)
By definition, habits are representations of stimulus–response links that do not
refer to goals, and are in a sense directly elicited by the environmental states or
stimuli or contexts. (Robbins and Costa 2017)
[M]ost modern research begins with a conceptual definition of habits as
cue–response associations inmemory that are acquired slowly through repetition of
an action in a stable circumstance . . . [M]ost habit researchers agree on the the-
oretical definition of habits as automatic cue–response associations. (Mazar and
Wood 2018, p. 14)
The following is not actually a definition, but a succinct explanation or descrip-
tion of how habit is acquired and activated, and we need to understand it in
order to distil from it a pldefinition of habit.
[H]abits are represented inmemory as direct context–response associations that
develop from repeated coactivation of the context and response. That is, when
the mental representation of a response (e.g. buckling seatbelt) is consistently
activated in conjunction with representation of a context (e.g. getting into a
car), associative links gradually form between the two . . . . The essential mecha-
nism behind direct cuing involves the cognitive neural changes that result from
repeated coactivation of responses and contexts. With repetition, incremental
changes occur in relevant processors or neural assemblies in proceduralmemory,
essentially tuning the processing elements in ways that facilitate the repeated
aspects of responding to recurring features of performance contexts. This grad-
ual development over repeated experience provides a selection mechanism for
habit learning because only those patterns that are consistently and frequently
repeatedwill be encoded in proceduralmemory in the formof habit associations.
(Wood and Neal 2007, p. 845, see also Neal et al. 2011, p. 1428, Wood and Rünger
2016, p. 294, Mazar and Wood 2018, p. 16)
Habit is acquired via both ‘cold’ processes (i.e. repetition of past associa-
tions between the experience of a cue and an action) and ‘hot’ processes
(i.e. experiencing a reward). As Wood and Rünger (2016, p. 295) put it:
‘dopamine signals promote habit learning as people initially repeat responses
to a reward. See alsoWoodandNeal (2007, p. 844) andCardenandWood (2018,
p. 117).
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There is, however, disagreementover the extent towhich ‘hot’ processes are
involved in habit because (a) dopamine signals become less active with repeti-
tion, as the reward recurs (Wood and Rünger 2016, p. 295); (b) habit formation
has been observed in the absence of tangible reward; and (c) the performance
of an intended action may itself be intrinsically rewarding (Gardner and Lally
2018, p. 217). In recognition of this disagreement I will keep both ‘cold’ and
‘hot’ processes in my analysis.
Letme explain howhabit is acquired and activated via a simple example of a
cinema-popcorn habit. Anna regularly visits the cinema, and almost every time
she does, she buys popcorn. Her visits to the cinema, and her actions of buy-
ing popcorn were carried out in a relatively stable context – e.g. the cinemas
she attended were always local, she always had money to buy popcorn, she
never bought chocolate and so on. During the first couple of visits, she made
a non-automatic (n.b. conscious) decision to buy popcorn because she enjoys
the sweet taste. In these early visits, she had not yet acquired the habit. After
severalmore visits, however, she began to buy popcorn automatically, virtually
every time she entered the cinema – once or twice she did not because shewas
on a diet. At this point in time she had, automatically, acquired the habit.
Entering the cinema had now become a cue and buying popcorn had
become a response to this cue – i.e. an action. Virtually every time she expe-
rienced the cue, she engaged in the action. Anna had gradually, and auto-
matically, built up a cognitive representation of the associations between the
experience of the cue and the action. This cognitive representation formed
in her cognitive system, more specifically, in her procedural memory.22 The
more she repeated the process of experiencing the cue, along with engaging
in the action, the more this cognitive representation strengthened – up to a
point.
Notice that Anna’s popcorn purchases were not activated by a cognitive
representation of an association between a cue and a reward – i.e. the sweet
taste of popcorn. If this were the case the cue-action associationwould be goal
dependent, not fully automatic. Neither was her action activated by the mere
fact of her buying popcorn previously, remembering it, and choosing to do
so again. The lesson here is that it is necessary to differentiate between bone
fide habits, and close relatives that also rely on (different types of) cognitive
representations such as stereotypes, informal rules or norms (Fleetwood 2019).
a habit proper is a memory-based cognitive associative entity which includes
a history of behavioural repetition. The latter distinguishes habits from other
cognitive representations underlying automatic processes, such as schemas, first
impressions, norms, or attributions. (Verplanken 2018, p. 4, see also Mazar and
Wood 2018, Marien et al. 2018)
22 It is not a contradiction to claim that habit is located in agents’ cognitive systems, whilst holding a
Phenomenological understanding of cognition as sketched in Section 2.4 above.
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Maréchal (2016, p. 218) has spotted this, writing: ‘Habits do indeed appear to
be something else than just past-dependent as in a traditional approach à la
Becker, where they are defined as the influence of past consumption on cur-
rent consumption’. There is an important lesson here. Not every unconscious
or automatic action is habitual action, and some of the things that socio-
economists often (mis)take to be habits may turn out to be something else –
e.g. stereotypes, norms or informal rules (Fleetwood 2019).
Moreover, if habits are cognitive representations, then they are located in
agents’ cognitive systems (Section 2.5), more specifically in procedural mem-
ory. Thismakes habit a feature of human agency andnot, for example, a feature
of social structure or institutions.
Sub-conclusion §4. Habit is a cognitive representation of a regularly experienced
cue and action response, located in procedural memory, acquired automatically
via ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ processes and activated automatically via the ‘cold’ experience
of a cue.
4.2. Habit as amechanism
Let us start with some pldefinitions of habit as a mechanism. For Orbell and
Verplanken (2015, p. 312) ‘The mental association derived from past stimu-
lus response association is the defining mechanism by which a habit response
occurs’. ForWood et al. (2005, p. 932) ‘research provides insight into the unique
mechanisms that regulate habit performance’. Labrecque and Wood (2015,
p. 308) refer to ‘the mechanisms that actually guide . . . habitual behaviours’.
Mazar and Wood (2018, p. 21) refer to ‘the habit cue–behaviour mechanism’.
These arewhat I referred to (in Section 2.1) as ‘weak’ pldefinitions, although the
Institutional economist Hodgson (2010, p. 4) offers a ‘stronger’ version, writing:
‘Habit is a causal mechanism’.
The term ‘mechanism’, or ‘causal mechanism’ has two ‘sides’ to it. First, it is
an abstract and general term that ‘stands in’ for things that we do not know, or
do not wish to cite or list. Second, whatever the mechanism is, it acts causally,
meaning that is exerts a causal influence on something, or is causally impli-
cated in causing something, either on its own, or (more often) in combination
with othermechanisms. This causal influence is almost always tendential – see
Section 4.4 below.
To say ‘a habit is a mechanism’ is to deploy the term ‘mechanism’ to stand
in for, and obviate the need to specifically identify something else, such as a
‘mental association derived from past stimulus response association’ as Orbell
andVerplankenput it above. It alsomeans that themechanism (e.g. the ‘mental
association . . . ’) is implicated in causing habitual behaviour. Put simply, habit
is said to be the mechanism that causes habitual behaviour.
Just to confuse matters, the terms ‘habits’ and ‘mechanisms’ can be used
in another sense. Habits as mechanisms, are themselves caused by other
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mechanisms. As one reviewer put matters ‘context-consistent performance is
the mechanism by which habit forms’ (emphasis added). In this context, to
form means to cause, or at least to be causally implicated. The same goes for
terms like ‘to reinforce’, and ‘to maintain’ as in the following comment from
Gardner and Tang (2013, p. 259) ‘Habitual performance reinforces the con-
text–behaviour link, and so habits are self-sustaining over time. Habit thereby
offers a mechanism for behaviour maintenance’. This is quite correct, but it is
not how the term is used in the context of saying ‘habit is amechanism’.23 I am
not concerned with this context.
The crux of the matter can now be stated. When we know enough about
the mechanism we believe is the habit that we can, for example, say ‘habit is a
mental association derived from past stimulus response association’ then we
should say this and avoid the term ‘mechanism’. Even if it is sometimes conve-
nient to say ‘habit is a mechanism’, it is a mistake (although not a serious one)
to define habit as amechanism, (a) becausewe do not need to; and (b) because
it confuses matters.
Sub-conclusion §5. It is a mistake to define habit as a mechanism – although not
a serious mistake.
4.3. Habit as a form of automaticity
Let us recall Section2.6 onautomaticity and say: habit isautomatic if it is uncon-
trolled, unintentional, goal dependent, purely stimulus driven, unconscious,
efficient or fast. Now, let us consider some pldefinitions of habit as a form of
automaticity.
[H]abits shouldbe seen as a formof context-dependent automaticitywhich, once
formed, are not necessarily enacted frequently unless the environmental triggers
are frequently experienced (‘habit as automaticity, not frequency’). This view-
point is important for two reasons. First, it views automaticity as the essence of
habit and explains the effects of established habit on action through automatic
processes. (Gardner 2012, p. 32)24
A habit is a form of automaticity in responding, which develops as a person
repeats a particular behaviour in stable circumstances. (Verplanken andMelkevik
2008, p. 16)
Habit might be usefully characterized as a form of automaticity that involves the
association of a cue and a response. (Orbell and Verplanken 2010, p. 374)
Habits [are] defined here as a form of automaticity. (La Rose 2010, p. 194)
There is a problem. To define habit as a form of automaticity is a terminological
mistake, or a category mistake – or both. For example:
23 This resonates with the discussion of processes in Section 4.5 below.
24 Gardner no longer holds this position, and now defines habit as a process. I leave the comment because,
clearly, others have not spotted the evolution in Gardner’s thought. See Mazar and Wood (2018) and
Marien et al. (2018) for comments on various aspects of automaticity in the specific case of habits.
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Gardner et al. (2012) argue the mechanism by which habit triggers behaviour
is automaticity, which is therefore the ‘active ingredient’ in the relationship
between habit and behaviour. (Rebar et al. 2018, p. 40)
Rebar etal. can say habit is themechanism, or habit is the active ingredient, that
triggers behaviour, but they cannot say habit is the automaticity that triggers
behaviour. The term ‘automaticity’ should be used as a reference to the way
habit is triggered, not as a reference to the habit itself. This is akin to saying
something like ‘a bicycle is a form of cycling’. Some psychologists are alert to
this:
The terms habit and automaticity are sometimes used interchangeably. Like
other automatic responses, habits are activated in memory in an autonomous
fashion without requiring executive control. Habits, however, are not synony-
mouswith automaticity but are best understood as learned automatic responses
with specific features. (Wood and Rünger 2016, p. 292)
But, it is neither a terminological nor a category mistake to say that habit is
acquired and activated automatically, or similar. The term ‘automatic’ should
not be used to define habit, but it can be used as part of the definition – i.e.
to illustrate the way habit is acquired and activated. The following is, arguably,
spot on: ‘A habit is often conceptualised as a learned response pattern that has
become automatic through repetition of the habitual behaviour (Verwijmeren
et al. 2011, p. 207).
Sub-conclusion§6. It is amistake todefinehabit as a formof automaticity, despite
the fact habit is acquired and activated automatically.
Point of clarification. To say that an action is automatic and goal dependent
seems to be a contradiction, but this is not so. A deliberate goal might have
been the initial cause of an agent’s action (e.g. buying popcorn), but as time
passes this goal becomes devalued. This does not mean that the habitual
action is not goal dependent, merely that the goal has ceased to be deliber-
ately pursued. As Verplanken (2018, p. 2) puts it: ‘while goals are often at the
heart of habit formation, over time they may fade away, and all we are left
with is an ingrained propensity to respond in a particular way to a specific cue’.
For Corbit (2018, p. 161) ‘It is now well established that even for behaviours
that may start out as flexible or goal directed, control can shift to a more auto-
matic and relatively goal-insensitive system, that is, these behaviours become
habits’.25
25 See Carden and Wood (2018, p. 117), Fishbach and Ferguson (2007, p. 311), Holland et al. (2006, p. 776),
Marien et al. (2018), Wood and Neal (2009, p. 580), Wood and Rünger (2016, p. 307), and Watson and
de Wit (2018). My position seeks to reconcile two positions: (i) habit represents a form of goal-directed
automaticity (e.g. Aarts and Dijksterhuis (2000), and (ii) habit represents a form of non-goal-directed
automaticity (Wood and Neal 2009). The latter define habitual actions as goal-independent, such that
any behaviour that arises as a product of the automatic activation of a goal is, by definition, not habitual.
I thank Ben Gardner for drawing my attention to this.
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4.4. Habit as dispositions, propensities or tendencies
Arguably, the most common pldefinition of habit found amongst socio-
economists, especially those influenced by Institutional Economics, is habit as
a disposition. Sometimes other terms are used such as abilities, affordances,
capacities, forces, liabilities, potentialities, potencies, processes, proclivities,
powers, propensities and tendencies.26 One of the most commonly cited defi-
nitions comes fromCamic (1986, p. 1044) for whom: ‘the term “habit” generally
denominates a more or less self-acting disposition or tendency to engage in a
previously adoptedor acquired formof action’. Indeed, I toohavedefinedhabit
as a ‘disposition, capacity or power that generates a tendency’ (Fleetwood
2012, p. 248). I now think this is incorrect.
Habit psychologists also, often define habit as propensities, dispositions or
tendencies. For Neal et al. (2012, p. 492) ‘habit can be defined as psychological
dispositions to repeat past behaviour’ and for Neal et al. (2006, p. 198) ‘habits
are automated response dispositions’. ForWood andNeal (2007, p. 845) ‘habits
are learned dispositions to repeat past responses’. For Galla and Duckworth
(2015, p. 509) ‘habits are automatic response tendencies that are triggered by
contextual cues’. For Darnton et al. (2011, p. 3) habit emphasises ‘a more or
less self-actuating disposition’. For Verplanken (2018, p. 4) ‘habits can thus be
defined asmemory-based propensities to respond automatically to specific cues,
which are acquired by the repetition of cue-specific behaviours in stable contexts’.
Despite the pldefinition of habit as a tendency being very common, I think
this is a mistake, albeit a subtle one. For reasons that will become clear, to
understand the term ‘tendency’ we need to start with notions of (ir)regularity.
4.5. Repetition, regularity and types of (ir)regularity
Habit is often associated with terms like ‘frequently’ and ‘consistently’,
although I will stick with ‘repetition’ and ‘regularity’. The concept of ‘regular-
ity’ is central to most versions of positivism and empiricism, where it indicates
the existence of a causal association. Where regular conjunctions of events,
actions or states of affairs are observed, a causal association is said to exist
(Psillos 2002).
Acquisition of habit requires a degree of regularity between the experience
of the cue and the action. Indeed, it is the regularity that causes the neural
changes that create the cognitive representation of the cue-action association
to form in procedural memory. But, just how regular must a regularity be in
order for habit to form?Weneed terminology that allows us to express degrees
of regularity. Fleetwood’s (2017) identification of four types of (ir)regularities is
useful, of which the following two are important here:
26 For further elaboration of some of these terms see Fleetwood (2009, 2011, 2012).
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4.5.1. Demi-regularity or demi-repetitive
Some parts of the world are characterised by partial, approximate, rough-and-
ready regularities or patterns in the flux of events – e.g. commuters sometimes,
perhaps often, but not always, cycle to work. These are referred to as ‘demi-
regularities’ or ‘demi-regs’ (Lawson 1997, 2003, pp. 81–83 and 105–107) and
styled ‘whenever event x, then sometimes, but not always event y’.
4.5.2. Stochastic event regularities
Some event regularities appear alongside terms like ‘stochastic’, ‘probabilistic’,
or ‘statistical’ and ‘statistical laws’. These kinds of event regularities are suffi-
ciently regular as tobeamenable to the standard techniquesof statistics, based
in concepts of probability. They are styled ‘whenever event x, then on average
event y’; or y = f (x+ ε); or more accurately ‘whenever the realised value of
the (independent) variable measuring event x, then the conditional mean of
the (dependent) variablemeasuring event y’. I refer to event regularities of this
kind as ‘law-like event regularities, probabilistically specified’.
Whilst the acquisition of habit requires a degree of regularity in the associ-
ation between cue and action response, it does not require this to be law-like
event regularity, probabilistically specified. Habit could be acquired via demi-
regularities. If agents display demi-regular habitual action, then the degree
of demi-regularity of the association, whatever it was, must have been suf-
ficient for the habit to form, even if this association does not conform to
any known mathematical or statistical principle such as an asymptote (Lally
et al. 2010, pp. 997 and 1007). The same goes for habit activation. Whilst
habit activation requires a degree of regularity in the association between cue
and action response, it does not require this to be law-like event regularity,
probabilistically specified. Habit could be activated demi-regularly.
4.6. From (ir)regularity to tendency
In no pldefinitions of habit as tendency, that I amaware of, is themeaningof the
term ‘tendency’ clarified. Fleetwood (2012) identifies six meanings, of which
the following two are important here:
(a) The empiricist conception of tendency – i.e. tendency as an empirically
observed (or observable) regularity in the flux of events, actions, or states
of affairs.
(b) Thecritical realist conceptionof tendency – i.e. tendency as thewayof acting
of a causal mechanism.
Consider (a). Due to the pernicious influence of positivism and empiricism
in economics and psychology, the term ‘tendency’ is commonly (mis)used.
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Sometimes it is used loosely to refer to a kind of ‘not-very-regular-but-regular-
enough’ regularity in the flux of events – and therefore behaviour. Sometimes
it is understood in terms of a ‘law’, and often given a stochastic inflection so
that the event regularities are law-like event regularities, probabilistically spec-
ified. Sometimes tendency is understood as a law, law is understood as a causal
law and tendency is, thereby, (mis)understood as synonymous with causality
as event regularity.
Empirical researchers often refer to the empirical regularities discovered in
statistical analyses as ‘tendencies’. Galla and Duckworth (2015, p. 509) appear
to use the term ‘tendency’ to cover all the above, writing: ‘for habit, what we
tend to do in the present is what we have tended to do in the past’. The term
‘tendency’ is central to Bayer and Campbell’s (2012) research, and whilst they
do not define it, it seems to be the empiricist conception because it is a mea-
sure of howmany times an act is undertaken. In theOxfordDictionary (10th ed.
2000) ‘Habit is a settled tendency or practice’, incorrectly equating tendency
with behaviour – i.e. the empiricist conception.
Now consider (b), the critical realist conception where a tendency is some-
thing that powers, forces, drives, propels, pushes, presses, shoves, thrusts, exerts
pressure, urges, and so on. This is very different from treating tendency as some
kind of empirical pattern. Any connection between tendency and events or
behaviour is broken because a tendency can be active, yet notmanifest itself at
the level of empirical events. Any connection between tendency and causation
as event regularity is also broken because tendency can be active, and yet not
manifest itself in event regularities. Tendencies are causal, but the conception
of causality is not event regularity.
How can a tendency be active yet not manifest itself at the level of events,
indeed not manifest itself at all? Simple, it is influenced by other mecha-
nismswith their own tendencies, some of which are countervailing tendencies.
Suppose our cinema-goer enters the cinema (experiencing the cue) but has
insufficient funds, or is on a diet, and so does not buy popcorn. This does not
mean thehabit has lapsed. Itmeans thathabitacts tendentially27 – i.e. she tends
to buy popcorn even if sometimes she does not. Moreover, if our cinema-goer
often does, but sometimes does not, buy popcorn, then her habitual behaviour
is demi-regular.
This raises thequestionofwhatmight prevent the cue leading to the action?
Labrecque and Wood (2015, p. 303) refer to the ‘circumstances under which
habits are not enacted, such as when they are overridden by competing moti-
vational forces before they are translated into behaviour’ – i.e. competing
causal mechanisms and their (countervailing) tendencies. These things could
be internal to agents’ cognitive systems (i.e. will power), or external to them
27 Transfactually acting things tend to bring about certain events, period. This must not be confused with
counterfactually acting things that would bring about certain events if certain conditions (e.g. ceteris
paribus) prevail. See Fleetwood (2009).
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(e.g. lack of funds), or part of the context such as place, time, situation, phys-
ical location, other people, and so on. See the next section, especially Rhodes
and Rebar’s (2018, p. 92) reference to ‘opposing or supporting motivational
influences’.
Whilst I am unaware of any habit psychologist mentioning critical realism,
many appear to hold something like a critical realist conception of tendency,
as the following example illustrates.
Upon experience of the cue, the approach tendency is triggered and results
in an urge to engage in the habitual behaviour. Whether the urge translates
into behavioural engagement or not depends on the strength of the learned
cue–behaviour association and the strength of any opposing or supporting
motivational influences . . . . [T]he urge to act is automatically triggered by the
cue . . . This learned cue–behaviour association translates into an approach ten-
dency such that when the man encounters the cue . . . he feels an urge to enact
the behaviour . . . This approach tendency elicits an influence on behaviour.
(Rhodes and Rebar 2018, pp. 92–93)
I have a slightly different ‘take’ on this. This differencemight bemerely seman-
tic, but it seems wise to clarify it. For Rhodes & Rebar, ‘the approach ten-
dency . . . results in an urge’, with the term ‘results in’ implying that the urge
and the tendency are two different things. For me, a person who has acquired
a cinema-popcorn habit has acquired a ‘learned cue–behaviour association
in procedural memory’. I refer to this in slightly different terms, namely, as a
‘cognitive representation of the cue-action association in procedural memory’.
Experiencing the cue causes firing in the neurons that constitute the cogni-
tive representation, the representation constitutes the urge, and the urge and
the tendency are the same thing. In other words, the cognitive representa-
tion (or the learned cue–behaviour association) is the neural substrate of the
urge/tendency.
In sum, it is correct to say ‘habit acts tendentially’ or ‘habitual behaviour
tends to occur’. But, it is either a terminological mistake due to ambiguous
phraseology, or a category mistake to say ‘habit is a tendency’, or to define
habit as a tendency or, for that matter, a propensity or disposition. This is not
mere word-play. Habit is simply not the kind of thing that can be a tendency.
The term ‘tendency’ should, however, be retained to describe the way habit
(whatever it is understood to be) acts.
Sub-conclusion §7. It is a mistake to define habit as a tendency, despite the fact
habit acts tendentially.
4.7. Habit as a process
Let us start with some pldefinitions of habit as a process.
This definition seems particularly promising in characterising habit as a process
rather than the consequence of a process or the behaviour itself. (Labrecque and
Wood 2015, p. 303)
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Adefinition is proposedwherebyhabit is a process bywhich a stimulus generates
an impulse to act as a result of a learned stimulus-response association . . . Habit
may be most coherently defined as a cognitive-motivational process. (Gardner
2015a, pp. 277 and 289)
‘Habit’ refers to a process whereby environmental cues automatically activate
an un-conscious impulse to perform a behaviour that has, through repetition,
become associatedwith those cues; ‘habitual behaviour’ denotes any action con-
trolled by this process. Habit forms through repetition of a behaviour . . . in a
stable context . . . . This reinforces amental context-behaviour association, to the
extent that the context becomes sufficient to activate the association, which in
turn triggers an impulse to perform the habitual behaviour, potentially without
intention, cognitive effort or awareness. (Gardner et al. 2014, p. 136)
[We] define habit as the process by which a person’s behaviour is influ-
enced from a prompt to act based on well-learned associations between cues
and behaviours. Habit is the process that determines behaviour, and habitual
behaviour is the output of that process . . . . Habits are cognitive, motivational,
and neurological processes. (Rebar et al. 2018, pp. 32 and 42)
In addition to these comments, it is useful to consider a schematic, and a
commentary that accompanies it by habit psychologists Rhodes and Rebar
(2018). In just two pages, they eloquently and succinctly describe, explain and
depict the main processes involved in habit acquisition and activation. It can
be considered ‘state of the art’ (Figure 1).
Habit is the process by which behaviour is influenced by well-learned
cue–behaviour associations, as is depicted in the top half of Fig. 6.1 . . . Over
time, as behaviour is reliably performed in the same context, people can learn to
associate certain cues . . . with the initiation of the behaviour. These associations
are stored in procedural memory and influence behaviour through elicitation
of behavioural approach tendencies. Upon experience of the cue, the approach
Figure 1. Rhodes and Rebar (2018, p. 93). A schematic of the process (top) and
an example (bottom) of habit influencing behaviour. Reprinted by permission from
Springer Nature Customer Service Centre GmbH: Springer Nature, The Psychology of
Habit: Theory, Mechanisms, Change, and Contexts, edited by B. Verplanken, © 2018.
https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-97529-0_6
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tendency is triggered and results in an urge to engage in the habitual behaviour.
Whether the urge translates into behavioural engagement or not depends on
the strength of the learned cue–behaviour association and the strength of any
opposing or supporting motivational influences (e.g. feelings of fatigue, oppos-
ing motivation or self-regulation). Because the urge to act is automatically trig-
gered by the cue, there is less need to deliberate about why and how to engage
in habitual behaviours. (Rhodes and Rebar 2018, p. 92)
Perusing their schematic and reading their commentary makes it clear that
they are describing an overall process consisting of six distinct component
parts, to wit:
(a) the regular engagement in behaviour in the same context – i.e. manwalks
child to school.
(b) learned associations between contextual cue and behaviour – i.e. at 8:00
am on a weekday morning the man regularly walks child to school.
(c) a tendency – i.e. the urge to walk child to school.
(d) a contextual cue – i.e. it is 8:00 am on a weekday.
(e) opposing or supporting motivational influences – i.e. the partner expect-
ing the man to walk child to school, or the man being tired.
(f) habitual behaviour – i.e. the man walks child to school.
According to Gardner, it is the entire process that ‘controls’, causes, or is
causally implicated in, habitual behaviour and, therefore, he reasons that habit
should be defined as the entire process.28 There are two ways of interpreting
this.
The first interprets it as rooted in a philosophical perspective underlying
this (although I have not seen it explicitly mentioned in the habit psychol-
ogy literature), namely, process philosophy. Essentially, process philosophy,
with ancient roots in Heraclitus, and more modern roots in Whitehead, has
recently appeared in social science where terms like ‘dialectical’, ‘recursive’
and ‘autopoietic’ are used to convey the idea of on-going, dynamic processes
unfolding in time. Some version of process philosophy could implicitly inform
the idea of habit as a process. If not, we might consider the second interpre-
tation, rooted in the perfectly legitimate idea that ‘everything is in process’.
Unfortunately, this can collapse into empty rhetoric. Davis (2016, p. 141) has
spotted this, writing: ‘it is not accurate to simply say that social reality is pro-
cessual . . . as this is an incomplete characterization of the properties of social
reality’.
Whichever interpretation is correct, the point is, many habit psychologists
define habit as the entire process. And, whilst I firmly believe that habit is
28 An anonymous reviewer wrote ‘habit is not any one of these components, but rather the sum of all
parts of these components, and the process by which these components operate to activate an impulse
towards a specific response when the cue is encountered’.
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acquired and activated via social, interpretive, cognitive, neurological, and
bodily processes, I think it is a mistake to say ‘habit is a process’ and offer two
reasons.
First, I noted (Section 2.1) that a taxonomic definition should not be con-
fused or conflated with accounts that describe, explain or depict. And yet this
is precisely what Rhodes and Rebar’s account does. What they offer is not a
definition, but adescription, explanationordepictionof theprocesses involved
in habit acquisition and activation. They refer to the habit process being
‘depicted’ in their schematic, without spotting that depiction and explanation
are not the same as definition, writing ‘explanations and definitions of habit do
not seem to be the source of this controversy’ (Rhodes and Rebar 2018, p. 95,
emphasis added). In fairness, Rhodes & Rebar do not actually claim to be giving
a definition of habit, but it is not unreasonable to interpret them as thinking
that they are doing just this. Something similar might be said of others who
define habit as a process. Many commentators slip between defining habit as a
process and describing habit as a process.
Second, to define habit as a process or to say ‘habit is a process’, is tomake a
terminological or category mistake, akin to defining water as a process, or say-
ing ‘water is a process’. Water emerges from a process of combining hydrogen
and oxygen (Elder-Vass 2010). But once it has emerged, this particular process
is ‘done and dusted’ as it were, and we are left with water as a thing, an entity.
Indeed, we define water as H2O, and say ‘water isH2O’. This conclusion cannot
be avoided by invoking two popular ideas:
(i) Everything (in the universe) is in process, therefore, water is no more than
molecular processes. This ignores emergence, and emergence explains
why we do not point to a glass of water and say ‘look at those molec-
ular processes’. In the same vein, we do not point to a habit and say
‘look at those social, interpretive, cognitive, neurological, and bodily
processes’.
(ii) Water is not, strictly speaking, a thing, because once it has emerged it
is always in process. It is, of course, true that the moment water as an
entity emerges, it is immediately involved in processes of decay, reproduc-
tion or transformation. But note that there is always a thing that under-
goes these processes. Habit remains habit despite undergoing various
processes which make it stronger, weaker, or whatever.
In sum, contra those who understand habit as the entire process, there is no
reason why we cannot single out one particular component part and make it
the defining feature of habit. In sum, then:
Sub-conclusion §8. It is a mistake to define habit as a process despite the fact
habit is acquired and activated via (social, interpretive, cognitive, neurological,
and bodily) processes.
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5. Conclusion: a taxonomic definition of habit for
socio-economics
The above arguments have, hopefully, ‘cleared the ground’, allowing us to
avoid being distracted by mistakes such as the mistake of pldefining habit
as (§1) behaviour or action; as (§2) a regular conjunction of actions; as (§3)
a stock of past actions; as (§5) a mechanism; as (§6) a form of automaticity,
even though habit is acquired and activated automatically; as (§7) a tendency,
propensity or disposition, even though habit acts tendentially; and as (§8) a
process, even though habit is acquired and activated via several processes. It is
not, however, a mistake to pldefine habit as (§4) a cognitive representation. To
turn this pldefinition into the kind of taxonomic definition of habit we require,
I need to add (stipulate) the concepts of ‘demi-regularity’ and ‘tendency’
thus:
Habit is a cognitive representation of a demi-regularly experienced cue and
action response, located in procedural memory, acquired automatically via ‘hot’
and ‘cold’ processes, activated automatically via the ‘cold’ experience of a cue
and tending to elicit demi-regular habitual action.
This taxonomic definition identifies the minimum number of properties suffi-
cient to demarcate habits from other unconsciously or automatically acquired
and activated cognitive representations (see Section 2.1).
The following schematics merely re-state, in summary form, the essential
features of habit acquisition, and habit activation, showing the roles played by
automaticity and tendency, as well as what Rhodes & Rebar call ‘other forms of
influences’ (Figure 2).
5.1. Future research
Unlike cognitive psychologists, habit theorists rarely discuss29 Ideomotor The-
ory (IMT) and/or the related Theory of Event Coding (TEC).30 In the future,
however, they may become necessary to incorporate recent developments in
these theories into habit theory. Whilst this is speculative, it would be remiss of
me not to mention it.
Very briefly, IMT and TEC conceive of the representations of an action (e.g.
buying popcorn), and of its anticipated effect, or outcome (e.g. eating pop-
corn) as governed by the same neural code and integrated into a hypothet-
ical entity called an ‘event file’. Actions and their anticipated effects become
29 Exceptions are Wood and Rünger (2016, p. 292), Wood and Neal (2007, p. 845), and Watson et al. (2017).
30 Interestingly, the fundamentals of IMTwere identifiedbyafigurewell-known to Institutional economists,
William James in the late nineteenth century and later by Roger Sperry. IMT has, however, developed
significantly since then. On IMT and TEC see Bunlon et al. (2015), Dignath et al. (2014), Haering and Kiesel
(2012), Henson et al. (2014), Herbort and Butz (2012), Herwig et al. (2007), Hommel et al. (2001), Hommel
(2009), Janczyk et al. (2012), Kunde et al. (2007), Pfister et al. (2011) and Shin et al. (2010).
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Figure 2. (a) A depiction of the processes of habit acquisition. (b) A depiction of the
processes of habit activation.
bi-directionally related, meaning actions can be caused via the activation of
their anticipated effects. Agents are ‘pre-prepared’ for, and can thus anticipate
the effects of actions that have been experienced in the past and encoded as
representations.
Whilst in IMT and TEC the focus is predominantly on actions and their antic-
ipated effects, it is possible that, in the case of habit, the cue or stimulus might
also be involved. The cue, action, and the anticipated effect may form a ‘cue-
action-effect’ binding and may even be integrated in the same event file. In
this case, the direction of causality between cue, action, and the anticipated
effect becomes complex, giving rise to several permutations. For example, the
(endogenously created) idea of eating popcorn, or the (exogenously created)
image of eating popcorn, could activate the buying of popcorn, or even a trip
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to the cinema. 31 Onegroupof researchersmake a similar point via the example
of eating croissants.
The smell of a freshly baked croissant can trigger the action of visiting a bak-
ery . . . However, even merely being reminded of croissants (e.g. by seeing a
painting of Paris) can trigger the trip to the bakery. This indirect stimulus-
outcome-response (S-O-R) priming effect . . . has been demonstrated experi-
mentally. (Watson et al. 2017, p. 2)
If it turns out to be the case, that the cue, the action and the effect are related
in complex ways, as IMT and TEC suggest, does this undermine my definition
of habit as a representation? No. Habit will still be a representation, but our
understanding of this representation will require further development.
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